

## TENTATIVE COURSE SYLLABUS

TOPICS	RESOURCE PERSON	NO. OF HOURS	TEACHING MODE	DISCUSSION POINTS
Introduction	All resource persons	3	Introduction to Class, Lecture, Discussion	Topical prospectus, overview of course requirements, discussion of participants' projects and research interests
Compatibilist Views of Free Will and Moral Responsibility	Terry Horgan	1	Lecture	Presentation of views that take free will and moral responsibility to be compatible with determinism.
Arguments For and Against Compatibilism	Terry Horgan	3	Lecture	Consideration of arguments on either side of the debate, especially the Frankfurt-case argument for compatibilism and the consequence argument for incompatibilism.
Compatibilism	Terry Horgan	2	Seminar: critical discussion of set texts	Discussion of the issues and readings on compatibilism by the participants and resource persons.
Libertarian Views of Free Will and Moral Responsibility	Mark Balaguer	1	Lecture	Presentation of the view that human beings are capable of libertarian freedom and moral responsibility, which involve a freedom-and-responsibility-enhancing variety of indeterminism.
Main Argument Against Libertarianism	Mark Balaguer	1	Lecture	Presentation of the argument that (i) to introduce undetermined events into a decision-making process is to introduce an element of <i>randomness</i> into that process, and hence, (ii) this could only damage and could not enhance free will or responsibility.
Valerian Response to the Main Argument	Tim O'Connor	1	Lecture	Presentation of libertarian views that take the important indeterminacy to be prior to the moment of choice, rather than at the moment of choice.
Non-Causal Response to the Main Argument	Tim O'Connor	2	Seminar: critical discussion of set texts	How is explaining an action by citing the agent's goals like or unlike explaining an event in the natural world by citing its causes? Is control over one's own action a wholly non-causal feature of it?
Agent-Causal Response to the Main Argument	Tim O'Connor	2	Lecture	Does control over one's own action involve a distinctive variety of causality, fundamentally unlike the causal mechanisms of impersonal systems? Could such control be embedded in a complex biological system?
Event-Causal Response to the Main Argument	Mark Balaguer	3	Lecture	Assuming a materialistic view of the mind according to which decisions are neural events, and all causation is event-causation, could it be that our decisions are both undetermined and appropriately non-random in the sense that's required for free will?
Determinism vs. Indeterminism	Mark Balaguer	2	Seminar: critical discussion of set texts	Are there any good arguments, empirical or a priori, for endorsing or rejecting causal indeterminism, or more specifically, the sort of indeterminism that's required for libertarian free will?
Is Conscious Will an Illusion?	Terry Horgan/Tim O'Connor	2	Lecture	Are there nonconscious causes of our decisions and actions? Is our feeling of conscious will an illusion?
<i>Participant presentations</i>	<i>Participants</i>	2	<i>Presentation of position papers and/or students' own work commented by resource persons and other participants</i>	

Mid-course Discussion	All resource persons	2	Participant discussion	
Moral Responsibility and Human Emotions I	András Szigeti	2	Lecture	The relationship between ascriptions of responsibility and typical emotional responses (e.g. guilt, anger, resentment)
Moral Responsibility and Human Emotions II	András Szigeti	2	Seminar: critical discussion of set texts	
Responsibility and Character	Tim O'Connor	2	Lecture	Ascriptions of responsibility and assessments of character
Moral Dilemmas and Dirty Hands	János Kis	2	Lecture	Can there be moral responsibility for harm in the absence of wrongdoing?
Moral Dilemmas and Dirty Hands	János Kis	2	Seminar: critical discussion of set texts	
The Normative Consequences of Moral Responsibility I	Thomas Schmidt	2	Lecture	What responsibility entails: the normative consequences of being responsibility with special focus on punishment
The Normative Consequences of Moral Responsibility II	Thomas Schmidt	2	Seminar: critical discussion of set texts	
Can Institutions Be Morally Responsible?	Thomas Schmidt	2	Lecture	Institutional action and the moral responsibility of institutions
<i>Participant presentations</i>	<i>Participants</i>	2	<i>Presentation of position papers and/or students' own work commented by resource persons and other participants</i>	
End of course discussion	All resource persons	3	Participant discussion	

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