

## Course schedule

### First week:

The nature of applied philosophy  
Abortion  
Ethics of War  
The ethics of consumption  
Punishment

### Second week:

Animals and ethics  
Liberalism and biases  
Organ selling and paternalism  
Psychiatric ethics  
The ethics of synthetic biology and biohacking

*The general format of the days:*

Session 1 – short introductory lecture on the topic of the day (50 min.)

Session 2 – seminar on the required readings, held in four small groups (100 min.)

Session 3 – lecture on a subtheme, based on the lecturer’s own current work (in most cases) and debate (100 min.)

### 1<sup>st</sup> week:

#### Monday:

<b>Topic</b>	Nature of Applied Philosophy
Faculty member(s)	Richard Arneson
Number of hours	5 (5*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min) – 4 parallel groups: Zoltan Miklosi and TBD Debate (100 min.)
Discussion points	Assume that we are in possession of timeless, universally applicable, correct moral principles. These might take the form of specifying fundamental moral rights that individual possess, or of specifying moral goals to be promoted, or moral goals to be promoted within the limits of given moral constraints. Make the further assumption that these moral principles are complete, in the sense that from a statement of the principles and a full description of the relevant empirical facts, one can deductively infer what one morally ought to do and what public policies ought to be chosen in any circumstances. But what if we end up believing after reflection that a certain course of action in our circumstances is morally right and all alternatives wrong but find after reflection that we cannot identify any consistent set of moral principles that coheres with this judgment—explains and justifies it and also yields acceptable implications for conduct in other circumstances. What then ought we to do?

Required reading:

John Rawls, “Some Remarks on Moral Theory,” in chapter 1 of his *A Theory of Justice* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).

T. M. Scanlon, “Rawls on Justification,” in Samuel Freeman, ed., *Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

**Tuesday:**

<b>Topic</b>	Abortion
<b>Faculty member(s)</b>	Jeff McMahan
<b>Number of hours</b>	5 (5*50min)
<b>Teaching mode</b>	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min) – 4 parallel groups: Jeff McMahan and TBD Debate (100 min.)
<b>Discussion points</b>	Opponents of abortion often defend their position by claiming that the fetus is a person, i.e. that fetuses share those properties of normal adult human beings that creates the presumption against killing them. Some defenders of abortion argue that because of the nature of the relationship between the fetus and the pregnant woman, abortion is permissible in many cases even if the fetus is a person. Others argue that abortion is permissible only if fetuses can be shown not to be persons.

## Required reading:

Jeff McMahan, *The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life* (Oxford University Press, 2011);

“[The Right to Choose an Abortion](#),” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 331-348.

“[Paradoxes of Abortion and Prenatal Injury](#),” *Ethics* 116, no. 4 (July 2006): 625-55.

“[Moral Intuition](#),” revised version, in Hugh LaFollette and Ingmar Persson, eds., *Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory, second edition* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

**Wednesday:**

<b>Topic</b>	The ethics of war
<b>Faculty member(s)</b>	Jeff McMahan
<b>Number of hours</b>	3 (3*50min)
<b>Teaching mode</b>	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (50 min.) – 4 parallel groups: Jeff McMahan and TBD Lecture and debate (50 min.)
<b>Discussion points</b>	According to the traditional account of the just war, the principal just cause for war is national self-defence against wrongful aggression. The morality of self-defence in relations between states is thought to be the same as the morality of self-defence in relations between individual persons, in that it is asymmetrical between the wrongful aggressor and the innocent victim. But the traditional theory applies this understanding only to the action of states in the resort to war. In the conduct of war by individual combatants, the morality of self-defence is claimed to be symmetrical between those who fight for a just cause (‘just combatants’) and those who fight without a just cause (‘unjust combatants’). Whether it is permissible to kill enemy combatants is thus independent of the reasons for killing them – that is, of the goals of the war. However, it might be argued that war is morally continuous with other, lesser forms of conflict and that the moral principles that govern the conduct of war are the same as those that govern the morality of individual self-defence and third party defence of others. That is, just combatants

	do not forfeit their right not to be attacked unless they fight by impermissible means.
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Required readings:

Jeff McMahan: Killing in War (Oxford University Press, 2009).

**Thursday:**

<b>Topic</b>	The ethics of consumption
Faculty member(s)	Orsolya Reich
Number of hours	3 (3*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (50 min.) – 4 parallel groups: Orsolya Reich and TBD Lecture and debate (50 min.)
Discussion points	We will evaluate and discuss the different arguments for taking our consumer behaviour to be a proper subject of evaluation. We will put a special emphasis on the alleged difference between our dietary and other consumer practices.

Required readings:

The Citizen Consumer Forum. Boston Review, Nov/Dec 2011

[http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf\\_ethical\\_consumption.php](http://www.bostonreview.net/BR36.6/ndf_ethical_consumption.php)

David T. Schwartz (2010): Consuming Choices. Rowman and Littlefield: Lanham.

<b>Topic</b>	Student presentations
Faculty member(s)	All
Number of hours	2*50
Teaching mode	seminar
Discussion points	The participants of the course will present their own research. There will be a short discussion after each presentation.

**Friday:**

<b>Topic</b>	Punishment
Faculty member(s)	Victor Tadros
Number of hours	5 (5*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min.) – 4 parallel groups: Victor Tadros and TBD Lecture and debate (100 min.)
Discussion points	Theories of punishment fall into three broad categories. Retributivists believe, roughly, either that wrongdoers deserve to be harmed, and that harming them by punishing them is therefore good, or that punishment is a fitting response to offenders' denial of their victims' rights. Communicativists, for their part, hold that punishment is a means by which we, the community, on the one hand communicate to wrongdoers

	that they have done wrong and on the other hand get them to acknowledge their wrongdoing. Finally, deterrence theories of punishment hold, again roughly, that punishing offenders is justified as a means to deter convicted wrongdoers themselves from reoffending, and putative wrongdoers from committing their first offence.
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Required reading:

Anthony Duff, *Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007

Victor Tadros, *The Ends of Harm* (Oxford University Press, 2011);

Andrew von Hirsch, *Censure and Sanctions*, Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993

## **2<sup>nd</sup> week**

### **Monday:**

<b>Topic</b>	Animals and Ethics
Faculty member(s)	Richard Arneson
Number of hours	5 (5*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min) – 4 parallel groups: Richard Arneson and TBD Debate (100 min.)
Discussion points	Many people hold that nonhuman animals are morally considerable. Their interests have some weight in determining what we morally ought to do. A vexing question is, how much weight should the interests of animals have, when satisfying their interests conflicts with satisfying the interests of human persons. This class examines two answers. One is that in virtue of possessing rational agency capacities beyond a threshold level, a sentient individual acquires the status of person and has full moral standing. Other sentient individuals that fail to qualify as persons have lesser moral status, their interests are to be discounted to some extent. An alternate answer is that all sentient beings are morally on a par.

Required reading:

Allen Wood, “Kant on Duties Regarding Nonrational Nature,” *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, supp. volume 72 (1998).

Peter Singer, “Speciesism and Moral Status,” *Metaphilosophy* vol. 40 (2009).

Jeff McMahan, “Cognitive Disability, Misfortune, and Justice,” *Philosophy and Public Affairs* vol. 25 (1996)

Further reading: Peter Vallentyne, “Of Mice and Men,” in Nils Holtug & Kasper-Lippert Rasmussen, eds., *Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

### **Tuesday:**

<b>Topic</b>	Liberalism and biases
Faculty member(s)	Andres Moles
Number of hours	5 (5*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min.) – 4 parallel groups: Andres Moles and TBD

	Lecture and debate (100 min.)
Discussion points	Research in social and cognitive psychology challenge some important assumptions about people's psychology that political liberals tend to accept. the seminars present a series of these challenges and suggests ways in which liberals can incorporate a revised version of human psychology and make it compatible with the protection/promotion of liberal values. In the first section, we look at the problem of implicit associations and social stereotyping. The first task is to ask whether these phenomena are unjust or threatening to autonomy. The second is to explore some possible replies open to liberals. The afternoon session explores some issues regarding Thaler and Sunstein's arguments for Nudge. Many liberals claim that nudge is illiberal because it fails to respect citizens as free and equal (irrespective of whether it is coercive). The session aims to provide a liberal defense of nudge as soft paternalism that is consistent with an empirically friendly view of human psychology.

Required reading:  
TBD

**Wednesday:**

<b>Topic</b>	Organ selling and paternalism
Faculty member(s)	Simon Rippon
Number of hours	5 (5*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min.) - 4 parallel groups: Simon Rippon- TBD Lecture and debate (100 min.)
Discussion points	Many thousands of people die every year as a result of a lack of donor organs being available for transplantation to patients who desperately need them. This class will explore the ethical dimensions of some policy alternatives for improving the availability of donor organs, including legalizing the sale of human organs, organ conscription, or switching from an opt-in to an opt-out system of after death donation.

Required reading:

Bostrom, Nick, and Toby Ord. "The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics." *Ethics* 116, no. 4 (July 1, 2006): 656–679. doi:10.1086/505233.

Debra Satz, "The Moral Limits of Markets: The Case of Human Kidneys," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 108, no. 1pt3 (2008): 269–288.

**Thursday:**

<b>Topic</b>	Psychiatric ethics
Faculty member(s)	Christopher Megone
Number of hours	5 (5x50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (100 min.) - 4 parallel groups: Christopher Megone- TBD Lecture and debate (100 min.)

Discussion points	We, will cover the debate about the nature of mental illness and the implications that an analysis of the concept have for the ethical issues that arise concerning the treatment of those who are in need of psychiatric treatment. This debate has raged for many years now stoked in the early 60's by the anti-psychiatry movement, but also informed by discussion of the medical model of illness/health and considerations of the extent to which the notion of illness is either an empirical matter or an objective matter.
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**Required reading:**

Rachel Cooper. 2005. *Classifying Madness*, (Springer, Dordrecht)

K.W.M. Fulford. 1990. "The Concept of Disease", in S.Bloch and P.Chordoff (eds), *Psychiatric Ethics*, (OUP, Oxford).

Megone, C. 1998. Aristotle's Function Argument and the Concept of Mental Illness. *Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology* 5, no.3: 187-201.

Szasz, T. 1960. The Myth of Mental Illness. *American Psychologist* 15:113-118, reprinted in Tom L.Beauchamp and Le Roy Walters (eds.) *Contemporary Issues in Bioethics*, Wadsworth Publications Co., 3rd Ed., 1989.

**Friday:**

<b>Topic</b>	The ethics of synthetic biology and biohacking
Faculty member(s)	Veronika Szanto
Number of hours	3 (3*50min)
Teaching mode	Lecture (50 min.) Seminar (50 min.) - 4 parallel groups: Veronika Szanto - TBD Lecture and debate (50 min.)
Discussion points	While the debates concerning genetically modified organisms, enhancement and other developments of biotechnology are still going on, the life sciences have already entered a new phase epitomized by synthetic biology and biohacking. Synthetic biology with its aspiration to create novel life forms and a parallel commitment of many of its practitioners to open source science pose new kinds of challenges to which bioethics has just started to react. The seminar/lecture (?) explores the major ethical challenges and possible responses.

**Required reading:**

Paul Rainbow, Gaymon Bennett: *Synthetic biology: Ethical ramifications* 2009, *Systems and Synthetic Biology*, 2009, Vol. 3, 99-108.

Patrick Heavey: *Synthetic biology ethics: A deontological assessment*, *Bioethics*, 2013, Vol. 27, 442-452.

<b>Topic</b>	Student presentations
Faculty member(s)	All
Number of hours	2*50
Teaching mode	Seminar
Discussion points	The participants of the course will present their own research. There will be a short discussion after each presentation.

## Bibliography

Preliminary reading list for the course:

MANDATORY READINGS ARE INDICATED ABOVE.

## Background reading:

### Core literature:

- Almond, B. and D. Hill (1992). Applied Philosophy. New York, Routledge.
- Audi, R. (1983). "THE APPLICATIONS OF CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS." Metaphilosophy **14**: 87-106.
- Bowie, N. E. (1982). "APPLIED PHILOSOPHY: ITS MEANING AND JUSTIFICATION." Applied Philosophy **1**: 1-18.
- Bradie, M., T. W. Attig, et al. (1983). THE APPLIED TURN IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY, V5. BOWLING, GREEN BOWLING GREEN UNIV.
- Downing, F. G. (1996). "On Applying Applied Philosophy." Journal of Applied Philosophy **13**(2): 209-14.
- Elster, J. (2011) "How Outlandish Can Imaginary Cases Be?" *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28.3, 241-258.
- Hansson, S. O. (2008). "Philosophy and Other Disciplines." Metaphilosophy **39**(4-5): 472-83.
- Hare, R. M. (1992). *Moral Reasoning about the Environment in Applied Philosophy*, Almond, Brenda (ed). New York, Routledge.
- Kasachkoff, T. (1992). "Some Complaints About and Some Defenses of Applied Philosophy." International Journal of Applied Philosophy **7**(1): 5-9.
- Katzner, L. (1982). "APPLIED PHILOSOPHY AND THE ROLE OF THE PHILOSOPHER." Applied Philosophy **1**: 31-8.
- Klinefelter, D. S. (1990). "How Is Applied Philosophy to Be Applied?" Journal of Social Philosophy: 16-26.
- Kopelman, L. M. (1990). "What Is Applied About 'Applied' Philosophy?" Journal of Medicine and Philosophy **15**(2): 199-218.
- La Follette, H. (1983). APPLIED PHILOSOPHY MISAPPLIED. THE APPLIED TURN IN CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY. BOWLING GREEN, BOWLING GREEN UNIV.
- Laughlin, M. (2000). "On the Meaning of 'Applied Philosophy'." Philosophical Inquiry: International Quarterly **22**(3): 17-37.
- Lippert-Rasmussen, K. and Archard, D. (2013) "Applied Ethics", *International Encyclopedia of Ethics*, Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 320-335.
- Mosley, J. L. (1987). "CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN APPLIED PHILOSOPHY." Metaphilosophy **18**: 214-21.
- Mulkay, M. (1981). "APPLIED PHILOSOPHY AND PHILOSOPHERS' PRACTICE." Science, Technology, and Human Values **6**: 7-15.
- Passmore, J. (1988). THE CONCEPT OF APPLIED PHILOSOPHY. PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE, V4. MONTREAL, ED MONTMORENCY.
- Pihlström, S. (1999). "Applied Philosophy: Problems and Applications." International Journal of Applied Philosophy **13**(1): 121-33.
- Santas, A. (1991). "Applied Philosophy: Oxymoron or Pleonasm?" International Journal of Applied Philosophy: 29-35.
- Shrader-Frechette, K. S. (1980). "TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AS APPLIED PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE." Science, Technology, and Human Values **6**: 33-50.

Singer, Peter (ed.) (1986) *Applied Ethics* OUP.  
Singer, Peter (2011) *Practical Ethics* 3<sup>rd</sup>. edition CUP.

Steinbock, B. (2004) "How has Philosophical Applied Ethics Progressed in the Past Fifty Years?" *Metaphilosophy* 44.1-2, 58-62.

Stevenson, L. (1970). "APPLIED PHILOSOPHY." Metaphilosophy **1**: 258-67.

Warren, B. (1992). "Back to Basics: Problems and Prospects for Applied Philosophy." Journal of Applied Philosophy **9**(1): 13-9.

Wilson, J. and B. Cowell (1985). "APPLYING PHILOSOPHY." Journal of Applied Philosophy **2**: 127-32.