



Tentative Syllabus - Problems of the Self

Topics and teaching staff

1. Mind the Body: the Sensorimotor Basis of the Self

Manos Tsakiris, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway

(<http://sites.google.com/site/wwwmanostsakiris/>)

2. The Embodied Self?

Hong Yu Wong, Philosophy of Neuroscience, CIN, University of Tübingen

(<https://sites.google.com/site/whywong/>)

3. The Origins of the Self

Phillipe Rochat, Department of Psychology, Emory University

(<http://www.psychology.emory.edu/cognition/rochat/>)

4. The Self: from Kant and Freud to Today

Beatrice Longuenesse, Department of Philosophy, New York University

(<http://as.nyu.edu/object/beatricelonguenesse.html>)

5. Culture and the Self

Peter Callero, Department of Sociology, Western Oregon University

(<http://www.wou.edu/las/socsci/faculty/callero.htm>)

6. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Chris Peacocke, Department of Philosophy, Columbia University

(<http://www.columbia.edu/cu/philosophy/fac-bios/peacocke/faculty.html>)

7. Jointly Acting Selves

Günther Knoblich, Cognitive Science Department, CEU

Natalie Sebanz, Cognitive Science Department, CEU

(<http://www.somby.nl>)

8. What are we?

Paul Snowdon, University College London

(<http://www.ucl.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/ps.html>)

Course format

The course will begin with introductory lectures to build common ground between the researchers from different disciplines. After the introductions, all segments will be held in a seminar format, with faculty members leading the seminar, and responses/commentaries delivered by teams of students. Each day of the course will feature seminars in two themes from two different disciplines. There will be specific time devoted to smaller group discussions, also led by a member of the faculty, and also opportunities for selected students to give talks and poster presentations. Alongside the regular program of the course there will be talks and discussions aimed at the general public held by invited speakers, including the developmental psychologist, Prof György Gergely, CEU, and the cognitive anthropologist, Prof Maurice Bloch, LSE.

Tentative Syllabus

Mind the Body: the Sensorimotor Basis of the Self

Manos Tsakiris

Royal Holloway, University of London

The recent distinction between sense of agency and sense of body-ownership has attracted considerable empirical and theoretical interest. The respective contributions of motor efferent signals and sensory afferent signals to these two senses of embodiment remain unknown. This segment of the course will consider the methodological problems encountered in the empirical study of agency and body-ownership, and then review recent psychological and neuroscientific experiments that study how the sense of body-ownership and agency are generated through the processing of sensory and motor information. In particular, the experiments presented will focus on (i) how multisensory signals interact with body representations to generate the sense of body-ownership, (ii) how the sense of agency modulates the sense of body-ownership, (iii) on their respective neural correlates, and (iv) how the sensorimotor basis of the bodily self can interact with psychological dimensions of self-awareness, such as the sense of one's identity.

Tsakiris M, Tajadura-Jimenez A & Costantini M (2011). Just a heartbeat away from one's body: interoceptive sensitivity predicts malleability of body representations. *Proceedings of the Royal Society, B, Biological Sciences*. 2011 Jan 5. [Epub ahead of print]

Tsakiris M, Longo MR & Haggard P (2010). Having a body versus moving your body: neural signatures of agency and body-ownership. *Neuropsychologia*, 48(9):2740-2749

Tsakiris M (2010). My body in the brain: a neurocognitive model of body-ownership. *Neuropsychologia*, 48(3):703-12.

Haggard P & Tsakiris M. (2009) The experience of agency: feeling, judgment and responsibility. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, 18, 4, 242-246

The Embodied Self?

Hong Yu Wong

Centre for Integrative Neuroscience, University of Tübingen

This segment of the course bridges one theme in the philosophical and scientific discussions on the self: embodiment. Recent empirical work (to be discussed by Dr. Manos Tsakiris) highlights a distinctive aspect of our ordinary lived experience: we feel our bodies 'from the inside' and have a sense of ownership over our bodies. What are the ramifications of this distinctive form of awareness of our bodies for a philosophical understanding of the kinds of things that we are? We will examine recent attempts to argue that we are embodied subjects based on distinctive aspects of bodily awareness and how it shapes action, and in particular, what metaphysical consequences we are entitled to draw about our own nature and how we can come to be acquainted with ourselves.

Brewer, B. (1995). Bodily awareness and the self. In: Bermúdez, J., Marcel, A., and Eilan, N. (eds) (1995). *The Body and The Self*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 291–309.

Cassam, Q. (1997). *Self and World*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Selections)

Martin, M. G. F. (1995). Bodily awareness: A sense of ownership. In: Bermúdez, J., Marcel, A., and Eilan, N. (eds) (1995). *The Body and The Self*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 267–285.

Olson, E. (2006) Is There a Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity? In F. MacBride, ed., *Identity and Modality*, Oxford University Press, 242-259.

de Vignemont, F. (2007) Habeas Corpus: The sense of ownership of one's own body. *Mind and Language* 22: 427–449.

The Origins of the Self

Philippe Rochat

Emory University

No account of the self can be complete without an understanding of its ontogenesis. This segment of the course will explore the emergence of self-consciousness from a developmental perspective. What is the earliest evidence for the experience of a self? What can be learnt from studies on contingency detection? What does the rouge test really measure? When do guilt and embarrassment develop, and why are we so prone to these feelings? A broad range of theories will be covered, focusing on social factors in the emergence of the self.

Gergely, G., & Watson, J. S. (1996). The social biofeedback theory of parental-affect-mirroring: The development of emotional self-awareness and self-control in infancy. *The Int. J. of Psych*, 77, 1-31.

Gergely, G. (2007) The social construction of the subjective self: The role of affect-mirroring, markedness, and ostensive communication in self development. In: L. Mayes, P. Fonagy, & M. Target, (Eds.), *Developmental Science and Psychoanalysis*. London: Karnac.

Rochat, P. (2009). *Others in mind. Social Origins of self-consciousness*. Cambridge? Cambridge University Press.

Rochat, P. (1995) (Editor). *The Self in Infancy: Theory and Research*, *Advances in Psychology Book Series No. 112*. Amsterdam: North Holland, Elsevier Science Publishers.

The Self: from Kant and Freud to Today

Beatrice Longuenesse

New York University

Any treatment of the nature of the self must be sensitive to the development of the concept of the self and its metamorphosis over different epochs. In this segment of the course we will examine conceptions of self-consciousness and self-reference in their development from Kant to contemporary philosophy of mind and language. Issues presented and discussed will include the following. What is the meaning of Kant's distinction between consciousness of oneself "as subject" and consciousness of oneself "as an object"? What is the relation between Kant's distinction and Wittgenstein's later distinction between "use of 'I' as subject" and "use of 'I' as object"? Unlike Wittgenstein's "use of 'I' as subject," Kant's analysis of what he calls consciousness of oneself "as subject" is not primarily meant to account for a particular way we might use the pronoun "I". Nor is it directed at the question: does the pronoun "I" have a referent? Rather, Kant's question is: what role is played, in the ordering of our mental contents, by the fact that we ascribe those contents to ourselves when using the pronoun "I" in "I think" (or "I think p")? Kant calls that ordering the "transcendental unity of apperception". There are striking similarities between the role Kant assigns to that unity and the role Freud assigns to the organization of mental events he calls "ego." How far can we take this connection? What can we make of it in light of contemporary philosophical and scientific accounts of the unity of consciousness?

Possible distribution of seminars:

1. Kant's 'I' in "I think": selections from the *Critique of Pure Reason*.
2. Wittgenstein's "Use of 'I' as subject" and its contemporary developments.

3. Freud's 'ego', and contemporary accounts of the unity of consciousness.
4. Self-consciousness and self-reference: Sartre and Wittgenstein.

Anscombe, G. E. M. (1975) *The First Person*. In Samuel Guttenplan, ed., *Mind and Language* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), pp. 45-65.

Evans, G. (1982). *Self-Identification*. In: *Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Freud, S. (1949) *The Ego and the Id*. London: The Hogarth Press Ltd. (Selections)

Kant, I. (1997) *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated/edited by P. Guyer and A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Short selections)

Sartre, J.-P. (2004) *Transcendence of the Ego*. Trans: Andrew Brown. Routledge. (Selections)

Wittgenstein, L. (1958) *The Blue Book*. From: *The Blue and Brown Books*. Oxford: Blackwell. (Selections)

Culture and the Self

Peter Callero

Western Oregon University

We are embodied creatures, acting creatures, exploring creatures, introspective creatures, but also essentially social and cultural creatures. This segment of the course, will provide (1) a general overview of different sociological analyses of self and identity with particular emphasis on how social and cultural forces shape the self, (2) a more focused examination of the self under conditions of modernity, including issues related to gender and technology, and (3) an examination of the relationship between self, identity and forces associated with cultural and economic globalization.

Callero, P.L. 2008. *The Globalization of Self: Role and Identity Transformation from Above and Below*. *Sociology Compass*, Volume 2, Issue 6, pages 1972–88.

Callero P.L. (2003). *The Sociology of the Self*. *Annual Review of Sociology* Vol. 29, pp. 115-133.

Elliot A. (2001). *Concepts of the Self*. Cambridge, UK: Polity (Chapter 5: *The Postmodern Self*)

Stets J.E., Burke P.J. (2003). *A Sociological Approach to Self and Identity*. Pp 128-52 in *Handbook of Self and Identity*. M Leary, J Tangney, editors. New York: Guilford Press.

Consciousness and Self-Consciousness

Christopher Peacocke
Columbia/UCL

The notion of the self is embedded in a web of related notions such as consciousness, self-consciousness, and the first person perspective. In this segment of the course we will focus on the metaphysics of subjects of experience and thought, and the relation of this metaphysics to various forms of first-person representation in perception and thought. Topics to be discussed will include: the ontology of subjects; its relation to subject-reflexive contents and their significance; the nature of self-consciousness, its representational and social significance; the varieties of self-consciousness, and connections to developmental and animal research; applications of Peacocke's account of subjects to the positions of Descartes, Kant, Wittgenstein and Strawson.

Peacocke, C. A. B. (2005) Another I: Representing Conscious States, Perception and Others. In: Thought, Reference and Experience: Themes from the Philosophy of Gareth Evans, ed. J. Bermúdez (Oxford University Press), pp.220-257.

Peacocke, C. A. B. (2011) Subjects and Consciousness. In: Self and Self-Knowledge, ed. A. Coliva (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).

Peacocke, C. A. B. (2010) Self-Consciousness. *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* 2010 (number 4) 521-552 Special Issue Le Moi/The Self/Le Soi ed. B. Longuenesse.

Jointly Acting Selves

Guenther Knoblich & Natalie Sebanz
Radboud University Nijmegen & Central European University

In this segment of the course, we will provide an overview of recent psychological work on joint action and discuss implications for the understanding of the self. We will (1) review how social interaction shapes basic processes of perception, action, and cognition that have traditionally been studied in single individuals, (2) discuss whether the unit of analysis in psychological work should be shifted from individuals to groups, (3) discuss how joint action might shape the experience of agency, and (4) consider the possibility that particular experiences only arise during joint action, such as group flow.

Knoblich, G., Butterfill, S., & Sebanz, N. (2011). Psychological research on joint action: theory and data. In B. Ross (Ed.), *The Psychology of Learning and Motivation*, 54 (pp. 59-101), Burlington: Academic Press.

Tsai, C., Sebanz, N., & Knoblich, G. (2011). The GROOP effect: Groups mimic group actions. *Cognition*, 118, 135-140.

Vesper, C., Butterfill, S., Knoblich, G., & Sebanz, N. (2010). A minimal architecture for joint action. *Neural Networks*, 23, 998-1003.

Sebanz, N., Bekkering, H., & Knoblich, G. (2006). Joint action: Bodies and minds moving together. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 10, 70-76.

What are we?

Paul Snowdon

University College London

The starting point for much reflection on the self is the question: What are we? Or in the first person singular: What am I? In this segment of the course, we shall take this question as the point of departure for thinking about our own persistence conditions and for exploring the kind things that we are. It will be argued that we are animals of a certain sort, in particular, that we are human animals. This contrasts with different classical philosophical theories of what we are, such as Lockean accounts on which we are psychological continuants (Locke, Shoemaker, Parfit), dualist accounts on which we are non-physical substances, and brain-identity accounts on which we are brains (Wiggins). A major question to be discussed is how work on the metaphysics of the self connects with empirical work on the nature of the self.

P. F. Snowdon (1996) 'Persons and Personal Identity' in *Essays for David Wiggins: Identity, Truth and Value*, Lovibond, S. and Williams, S. (eds.), Blackwells .

P. F. Snowdon (1995) 'Persons, Animals and Bodies' in *The Body and the Self*, Bermudez, J., Eilan, N. and Marcel, A. (eds.), MIT Press.

P. F. Snowdon (1991). Personal Identity and Brain Transplants. In *Human Beings*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

P. F. Snowdon (1990). Persons, Animals, and Ourselves. In Christopher Gill (ed.), *The Person and the Human Mind: Issues in Ancient and Modern Philosophy*. Oxford University Press.